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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
MARK G. MILLER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 930090-CA 
Category No, 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992); unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37a-5(l) (1990); and two traffic code offenses; driving under the 
influence and failure to use headlight both class B 
misdemeanors. 
This Court has jurisdiction re hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court permissibly rule that the 
officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant? 
A trial court's determination that reasonable suspicion 
existed for an investigative detention will not be overturned 
unless clearly erroneous. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 
(Utah 1987); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah App. 
1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). But see State v. 
Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991) (applying nondeferential, 
"correction of error" standard in reversing trial court's 
reasonable suspicion determination), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1992) . 
2. Did the trial court permissibly rule that defendant 
had abandoned any privacy interest in his urine, which he left 
unflushed in the jail's urinal? 
The question of abandonment "is primarily a factual 
question of intent to voluntarily relinquish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, which may be inferred from 'words spoken, 
acts done, and other objective facts.'" State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 
730 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 
1992). Accordingly, as with other questions of fact, this Court 
reviews the trial court's findings under a clearly erroneous 
standard. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1991); unlawful possession of 
2 
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37a-5(l) (1990); and two traffic code offenses: driving under 
the influence and failure to use headlights, both class B 
misdemeanors (R. 1-2). 
Defendant filed motions to suppress physical evidence 
allegedly seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Utah 
Code Ann § 77-7-15 (1990), which the trial court denied (R. 49-
72, 91-93). He then entered, and the trial court accepted, 
conditional guilty pleas to all charges, preserving the right to 
appeal the denials of his motions to suppress (R. 133-40). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court did not make detailed findings of fact 
in denying defendant's motions to suppress. See Memorandum 
Decision (R. 91-93) (copy contained in an addendum attached to 
this brief). However, it is reasonable to assume that all of the 
following facts were found by the court. See State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah 1991). 
At approximately 11:30 p.m. on February 1, 1991, a 
Logan City police officer, who was working a special alcohol 
assignment, observed a Jeep Cherokee parked on the side of the 
street near a drinking establishment. The officer could see a 
driver and passenger in the vehicle. The Jeep's headlights were 
not on. The officer pulled his unmarked car into a nearby 
parking lot and parked where he could see the Jeep. His purpose 
was determine whether someone in the Jeep was drinking alcohol 
3 
(PH. 6-7, 34)1. 
A couple of minutes after parking his car, the officer 
heard the Jeep's engine start. Without its lights on, the Jeep 
then pulled a car length or two forward, made a U-turn, and 
proceeded down the street. Approximately ten seconds later, the 
Jeep made a full stop at a stop sign, where the vehicle's lights 
came on. It then drove through the intersection and pulled to 
the curb. The driver got out and walked around the vehicle to 
the passenger side where another individual had just exited. The 
passenger replaced the driver, and the Jeep drove away (PH. 8-9). 
After following the Jeep for a short distance, the 
officer stopped it based on the suspicious change of drivers, 
which came after the Jeep had made a U-turn and driven a distance 
without its lights on. The officer approached the driver and 
asked to speak to the passenger, who was defendant. When the 
officer asked defendant why he and the current driver had traded 
places, defendant responded, "I've had too much to drink, so I 
didn't want to drive." Field sobriety tests of defendant led to 
his arrest for driving under the influence (PH. 9-13, 38-39). 
When defendant was booked into jail, the officers 
removed from his person a small amount of cocaine and two rolled 
bills (one $50 and one $5), both of which had cocaine on them. 
Although defendant submitted to a breath test, he refused urine 
and blood tests. Defendant was placed in a holding room in view 
1
 The court and the parties relied on the evidence 
presented at the preliminary hearing to provide the factual basis 
for decision on defendant's motions to suppress (Transcr. of 
Hearing 4/14/92, at 11-21). References to "PH" are to the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing held August 27, 1991. 
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of the arresting officer. There, defendant urinated in a urinal 
but did not flush it. Noticing that defendant had not flushed 
the toilet and was now in another part of the room, the officer 
had the jailer remove defendant from that room. The officer then 
obtained a urine sample from the basin of the urinal, without 
defendant's knowledge or consent. No one else was in the holding 
room and no one but defendant had used the urinal. The state 
crime lab found traces of cocaine and marijuana in the urine 
sample (PH. 17-24, 49, 60, 62). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues the trial court erroneously determined 
that the initial stop of defendant's vehicle was legal, claiming 
that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity and was pretextual. Both claims fail. 
The trial court found that the detaining officer had at 
least reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation (improper U-
turn and failure to use headlights) when he stopped defendant's 
vehicle, and therefore the stop was legal. Defendant does not 
challenge this finding, arguing instead that the officer actually 
stopped defendant to investigate a possible DUI, for which there 
allegedly was no reasonable suspicion, and thus the stop was 
unconstitutional. 
Defendant misinterprets Fourth Amendment law. Even if 
the officer had only an insufficient "hunch" that defendant had 
driven the car while under the influence of alcohol, the stop was 
nevertheless a legal stop for the U-turn and no-lights 
violations. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that 
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whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred is determined 
through an objective assessment of the circumstances confronting 
the officer; the officer's subjective mental state is irrelevant. 
Therefore, it did not matter that the officer may have had 
insufficient facts to form a reasonable suspicion of DUI; he 
clearly had at least reasonable suspicion to stop for the other 
traffic violations. 
Defendant's pretext argument similarly misunderstands 
the pretext stop doctrine. The inquiry in pretext analysis is 
whether an otherwise legal stop is nevertheless unconstitutional 
because a reasonable officer would not have made the stop under 
the circumstances. The test is an objective one, which 
disregards the officer's subjective mental state and turns on an 
assessment of usual police practice. Defendant failed to point 
to anything below that suggested a reasonable officer would not 
normally have stopped a vehicle for improper U-turn or failure to 
use headlights, and he likewise fails to do so on appeal. 
Accordingly, the Court should summarily reject defendant's 
pretext claim. 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress a sample of his urine the police 
obtained from a jailhouse urinal. He claims he had a 
constitutionally protected privacy interest in his urine and the 
urinal, and thus the police needed a warrant to seize the urine. 
The basic problem with defendant's argument is that he 
does not challenge the basis upon which the trial court denied 
his motion to suppress the urine sample — i.e., abandonment. 
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The trial court found that defendant had abandoned whatever 
privacy interest he had in his urine when he did not flush the 
urinal and walked away from it to another part of the room. Left 
unchallenged, the trial court's finding of abandonment disposes 
of the Fourth Amendment issue. Therefore, defendant's attack on 
the court's ruling necessarily fails. 
Finally, because defendant provides no legal analysis 
to support his claim that the trial court should have excluded 
the urine sample based on a faulty chain of evidence, the Court 
should not consider it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDING OF REASONABLE SUSPICION TO 
SUPPORT THE STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
Defendant argues the trial court erroneously determined 
that the initial stop of defendant's vehicle was legal. He 
claims the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity and therefore violated Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 
(1990). That statute is merely a codification of the Fourth 
Amendment standard for an investigatory stop enunciated in Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 
541 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
A. Standard of Review 
A trial court's determination that reasonable suspicion 
existed for an investigative detention is a finding of fact 
subject to the deferential, clearly erroneous standard of review. 
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State v, Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah App- 1991), cert, denied, 843 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah 
App. 1990); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1990); 
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 941-42 (Utah App. 1988). See also 
State v. Rochell, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 42-43 (Utah App. 1993) 
(Bench, J., concurring, joined by Jackson, J.) (arguing that 
Mendoza's standard of review has not been altered by State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)). But see State v. Munsen, 
821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991) (applying nondeferential, 
"correction of error" standard in reversing trial court's 
reasonable suspicion determination), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1992). Factual findings are not clearly erroneous unless 
they are against the clear weight of the evidence, or the 
appellate court reaches a "definite and firm conviction" that the 
trial court was mistaken. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
B. Reasonable Suspicion Standard 
There is reasonable suspicion to justify an 
investigative stop if, from the facts apparent to an officer and 
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the officer would 
reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d at 667. 
See also State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992). 
"This suspicion must be 'based upon articulated "objective facts" 
then apparent to the officer.'" Roth, 827 P.2d at 257 (quoting 
Sandy Citv v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah App. 1989)). 
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Reasonable suspicion "is considerably less than proof of 
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). The level of suspicion required 
for an investigative stop "is obviously less demanding than that 
for probable cause." Ibid. In evaluating the validity of such a 
stop, a court must consider "'the totality of the circumstances 
— the whole picture.'" IcL. at 8 (quoting United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). See also Roth, 827 P.2d at 
257. As Sokolow notes: 
"The process does not deal with hard 
certainties, but with probabilities. Long 
before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people 
formulated certain common-sense conclusions 
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders 
are permitted to do the same — and so are 
law enforcement officers." 
Ibid, (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418). 
Furthermore, that the behavior may be as consistent 
with innocent conduct as criminal does not defeat a finding of 
reasonable suspicion. As the Supreme Court said in Sokolow: 
"'[T]here could, of course, be circumstances in which wholly 
lawful conduct might justify the suspicion that criminal activity 
was afoot.' Indeed, Terry itself involved 'a series of acts, 
each of them perhaps innocent' if viewed separately, 'but which 
taken together warranted further investigation.'" 490 U.S. at 9-
10 (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per 
curiam); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)). 
C. The Instant Case 
Here, the trial court found that there was reasonable 
suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle for an improper U-turn and 
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operating a motor vehicle after dark without lights. Memorandum 
Decision at 1-3 (R. 91-93). The court accepted the prosecution's 
argument that the officer had at least reasonable suspicion of a 
violation of Utah's U-turn law (Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-67 (1988)) 
and vehicle lighting laws (Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-117 through 122 
(1988)). See State's Response at 3 (R. 76). 
Defendant does not argue that the officer lacked 
reasonable suspicion to stop the Jeep for these observed traffic 
violations, commenting only that "the failure to use headlights 
for approximately ten (10) seconds . . . may not constitute a 
traffic offense under the circumstances." Br. of Appellant at 16 
(emphasis added). Rather, he asserts the officer did not have 
any basis to stop for driving under the influence and that 
detention for the minor traffic offenses was pretextual. 
Therefore, he claims, the stop of the Jeep was unconstitutional. 
Defendant's argument should be summarily rejected. 
Even if the officer had only an insufficient "hunch" that 
defendant had driven the Jeep while under the influence of 
alcohol when he made the stop, such did not undermine the 
legality of the stop for the U-turn and no-lights violations. It 
is well settled that "[w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has 
occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer's 
actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him 
at the time, and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the 
time the challenged action was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 
U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (citations omitted). Accord Scott v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). The other traffic 
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violations, committed in the officer's presence, gave him a 
legally sufficient basis to stop the Jeep; his subjective mental 
state was irrelevant. 
Defendant's pretext argument, which again focuses on 
the officer's alleged subjective intent concerning a possible 
DUI, fares no better. This Court applies the following standard 
for determining whether a pretext stop has occurred: " [I]f a 
hypothetical reasonable police officer would not have stopped the 
driver for the cited offense, and the surrounding circumstances 
indicate the stop is a pretext, the stop is unconstitutional." 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 979 (Utah App. 1988), disavowed on 
other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990). 
The inquiry focuses on whether the reasonable officer would have 
made a stop under the circumstances, not whether the officer 
could have made a stop. Id. at 978; State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 
1040, 1046 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
The test is an objective one, which looks to usual police 
practice to determine whether the reasonable officer would have 
made the stop. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; Lopez, 831 P.2d at 
1048-49. "[T]he officer's subjective motivation is not the 
relevant inquiry." Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1047 (citing Sierra, 754 
P.2d at 977).2 
2
 The Lopez majority opinion is not altogether clear on the 
relevance of the officer's subjective intent to the pretext 
inquiry. For example, it consistently defines the pretext 
standard as the "objective question of whether a reasonable 
officer would have made the stop under the same circumstances 
absent the illegal [or unconstitutional] motivation." Lopez, 831 
P.2d at 1047 (second emphasis added). This statement arguably 
leaves the door open to consideration of the officer's subjective 
intent. However, in light of the majority's repeated 
-11-
Defendant makes no effort to show that the reasonable 
officer would not normally stop for the traffic violations that 
occurred here. In fact, he did not do this below. As this Court 
made clear in Lopez, once the State has established that a 
traffic violation occurred in the officer's presence or that the 
officer had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe a 
traffic violation had occurred, the defendant who alleges pretext 
must point to some evidence that the stop was not consistent with 
usual police practice. Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1049. In the absence 
of any such evidence, the pretext argument necessarily fails. 
See State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 282 (Utah App. 1992) 
(Orme, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in 
part, joined by Billings, J.) (lack of any evidence offered by 
defendant to counter the objectively reasonable conduct of 
officer defeated defendant's pretext claim). Accordingly, the 
Court should reject defendant's pretext argument. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT HAD ABANDONED 
ANY PRIVACY INTEREST IN HIS URINE AND THAT 
THE POLICE SEIZURE OF THE URINE THEREFORE DID 
NOT IMPLICATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
In the trial court, defendant challenged the 
admissibility of the urine sample obtained by the police from the 
admonishments that the officer's subjective intent is not 
relevant, e.g., ibid, ("a focus on an individual officer's 
subjective intent as the measure of whether a stop is a pretext 
would violate the United State Supreme Court's ruling that the 
Fourth Amendment mandates an objective inquiry into police 
activity"), the State's discussion of pretext doctrine assumes 
this Court intends that an officer's subjective intent be 
irrelevant. 
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urinal on the ground that he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the urinal. This, he claims, required the police to 
obtain a warrant before seizing his urine from the urinal. 
Def.'s Mot. to Suppress Specimen Result (R. 49-58). The State 
argued that the urine sample was obtained only after defendant 
had abandoned his urine and any Fourth Amendment privacy interest 
he had therein. State's Resp. Mem. at 4-5 (R. 77-78). The court 
adopted the State's argument and denied defendant's motion to 
suppress the urine sample. Memorandum Decision at 2 (R. 92) 
("The Defendant has moved this Court to suppress the specimen 
result [sic] taken as an invasion of the Defendant's privacy. 
For reasons set forth in the State's response thereto that Motion 
is denied."). 
A. Abandonment 
The question of abandonment "is primarily a factual 
question of intent to voluntarily relinquish a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, which may be inferred from 'words spoken, 
acts done, and other objective facts.'" State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 
730, 736 (Utah App.) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 
850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992). Accordingly, as with other questions 
of fact, this Court reviews the trial court's findings under a 
clearly erroneous standard. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
While "the burden of proving abandonment falls on the 
state, and must be shown by 'clear, unequivocal and decisive 
evidence,'" Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736, defendant makes no effort on 
appeal to demonstrate that the trial court's finding of 
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abandonment was clearly erroneous. Indeed, defendant does not 
even discuss the abandonment issue. Because the burden of 
showing error is on the party who seeks to upset the trial 
court's judgment, State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 
1982), this Court could affirm the abandonment finding on the 
sole basis that defendant has failed to challenge it on appeal. 
See State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228 (Utah App. 1992) (declining 
to consider a Fourth Amendment issue raised by the defendant 
because he did not challenge the trial court's dispositive "no 
standing" ruling). 
Even if this Court were to address independently the 
abandonment issue, the trial court's ruling is consistent with 
cases from other jurisdictions that have considered similar 
facts. For example, in Venner v. State, 354 A.2d 483 (Md. App. 
1976), aff'd, 367 A.2d 949 (Md.), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 932 
(1977), the court held that a criminal defendant did not have a 
constitutionally protected right of privacy in his excrement 
deposited in a bedpan while he was a hospital patient. The 
police obtained the excrement, which contained a number of 
balloons of hashish oil, after nurses had in the course of normal 
routine removed the bedpan from the defendant's room. Noting the 
general principle that one does not retain a Fourth Amendment 
privacy interest in items once owned, possessed, or controlled if 
the items are abandoned, 354 A.2d at 493, the court observed: 
It could not be said that a person has no 
property right in wastes or other materials 
which were once a part of or contained within 
his body, but which normally are discarded 
after their separation from the body. It is 
not unknown for a person to assert a 
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continuing right of ownership, dominion, or 
control, for good reason or no reason, over 
such things as excrement, fluid waste, 
secretions, hair, fingernails, toenails, 
blood, and organs or other parts of the body, 
whether their separation from the body is 
intentional, accidental, or merely the result 
of normal body functions• 
But it is all but universal human custom 
and human experience that such things are 
discarded — in a legal sense, abandoned — 
by the person from whom they emanate, either 
"on the spot", or, if social delicacy 
requires it, at a place or in a manner 
designed to cause the least offense to 
others. 
Id. at 498-99. 
Based on the foregoing, the court then held that the 
defendant, who did nothing and said nothing to indicate an intent 
to assert his right of ownership, possession, or control over his 
feces or the balloons contained therein, had abandoned them. Id. 
at 499. Therefore, defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest in his excrement, and such was lawfully retrieved by the 
police. Ibid. 
A similar conclusion was reached in United States v. 
Woods, 3 M.J. 645 (NCMR 1977), which held that examination by 
authorities of excrement emitted by the accused while he was in 
detention during an investigation of illegal possession of heroin 
did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, because the excrement had been abandoned by the 
accused. Id. at 646-48. 
The reasoning of Venner and Woods applies here. 
Whatever Fourth Amendment privacy interest defendant had in the 
urine he deposited in the jailhouse urinal was abandoned when he 
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did not flush the urinal and walked away from it. In short, 
assuming defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
urine when he first deposited it in the urinal, his actions 
manifested a voluntary relinquishment of that privacy interest. 
See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 736. 
B. Chain of Evidence 
Defendant's additional "chain of evidence" challenge to 
the admissibility of the urine sample is defective. The trial 
court conditionally rejected this challenge, leaving open to 
defendant the opportunity to produce authority contrary to the 
court's position (Transcr. of Hearing 11/17/92, at 57). However, 
there is no indication in the record or defendant's appellate 
brief that he ever presented contrary authority to the court. 
More importantly, defendant fails to provide any 
analysis of the issue in his appellate brief, content simply to 
state, without elaboration, that "admitting such evidence is . . 
. violative . . . of defendant's trial right to be free from 
highly prejudicial evidence being received when the source of 
such evidence is insufficiently linked to the defendant." Br. of 
Appellee at 20. It is well settled that an appellate court 
generally will not address arguments not supported by legal 
analysis. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) 
("Since the defendant fails to support [her] argument by any 
legal analysis, we decline to rule on it."); State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (approving principle that appealing 
party may not "dump the burden of argument and research" in the 
appellate court); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 
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1992) (declining to address inadequate appellate argument under 
rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and citing 
supporting precedent). 
Accordingly, this Court should not consider defendant's 
"chain of evidence" argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motions to 
suppress and affirm his conviction. 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
MARK G. MILLER, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 911000087 
THIS MATTER IS before the Court upon the Defendant's Motion 
to Quash the Bindover. Cited for authority by the Defendant is 
State vs. Humphrey, 176 Advanced Reports (Dec. 18, 1991). This 
Court has earlier ruled on the issue with respect to whether 
State vs. Humphrey requires a full review of the transcript of 
the Preliminary Hearing. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed 
the entire transcript. With respect to the issues raised in 
State vs. Humphrey, specifically that of jurisdiction, the 
Court finds that it does have jurisdiction in this case. 
Specifically with respect to the corpus delicti argument raised 
by the defense and for the reasons set forth in the State's 
Response, the Motion is denied. Evidence was produced that the 
Defendant was stopped as a result of illegal conduct (operating 
a vehicle after dark, u-turn, no lights) and when further 
inquiry was made, by the officer, as to behavior by the 
Defendant, he volunteered that he had too much to drink to be 
able to drive. That simply lead to further investigation by 
the officer. 
Whether that statement is specifically necessary in order 
to establish corpus delicti depends upon the availability or 
lack of other facts. The officer did have facts available to 
him, by observation, that someone was operating the vehicle and 
that 
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someone left the vehicle and went around to the passenger 
side. Whether that specific person was the Defendant or the 
person in the back seat that had been operating the vehicle was 
cleared up by an admission by the Defendant that he in fact had 
been drinking to much and therefore did not want to drive. 
Thereafter field sobriety and breath tests were administered. 
Defendant can still raise the defense that in fact it was not 
he who was driving, but was the passenger found in the rear of 
the vehicle. Circumstantial evidence would be sufficient 
without the admission by the Defendant, and for preliminary 
hearing purposes that he was the driver in order for the State 
to establish the corpus delicti of the crime. For purposes of 
affirming the finding of the magistrate and the bindover order. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
The Defendant has moved this Court to suppress the specimen 
result taken as an invasion of the Defendant's privacy. For 
reasons set forth in the State's Response thereto that Motion 
is denied. 
MOTION TO DISMISS OR SUPPRESS 
This matter is likewise before the Court upon a Motion to 
Dismiss or Suppress for the reason that the Defendant was 
stopped without probable cause and in violation of Section 
77-7-15 of the Utah Code and in addition thereto that the stop 
was a pretext stop. 
The Court has already addressed the issue with respect to 
the violation of the traffic laws observed by the officer and 
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its causal sufficiently to stop the vehicle in which the 
Defendant was riding to either issue a citation or further 
investigate. Upon further investigation it was determined that 
intoxication was a factor. In addition, the officer had some 
suspicion that there may be something more wrong with the 
Defendant's driving than simply making an improper u-turn with 
out lights. 
The question is whether the officer is permitted by law, 
given the totality of the circumstances to make the stop. This 
Court would find that in fact the officer articulated a 
reasonable cause to stop the vehicle and pursuant thereto 
inquired of the driver as to the behavior. His response could 
have been a number of things, such as he simply forgot to turn 
the lights on or otherwise, but his response was, HI have had 
to much to drinkM. The initial stop was justified. In the 
Defendant giving the statement and all of the other 
circumstances involved, the Court finds that the stop was 
justified as was the further investigation and therefore the 
Motion is denied. 
Counsel for the State is directed to prepare a formal Order 
in conformance herewith. 
